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Falklands War

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The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas or the Malvinas War) was an armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands between March and June 1982. Though surprised by an Argentinean attack on the islands, Britain eventually prevailed and the islands remained in British hands, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. In Argentina, the conclusion of the war led to the downfall of the military junta and the restoration of a system of democracy.

Table of contents

Background

The Falklands consist of two main and many smaller islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina. Ownership of the group had long been disputed. The Falklands were probably first discovered in the 1520s by the Spanish. The first British claim dates from 1592. In 1690, the British named them after the Treasurer of the Navy, Viscount Falkland. On April 5, 1764, France established a settlement on East Falkland and claimed the islands, which the Spanish offered to buy as they were concerned about disrupting the balance of power in the region. In 1765, the British established a settlement on Saunders Island, and in 1767 France transferred its settlement to Spain. In 1770, the Spanish captured the British settlement, but in 1771 it was handed back. In 1774 and 1806-11, respectively, the British and Spanish left the islands, each maintaining a claim over them. It is in this general period that the confusion lies.

Argentina gained independence from Spain in 1816 and moved to occupy the Falklands (Islas Malvinas) in 1820, but that settlement did not endure and the Argentinean claim similarly fell into abeyance. Finally, in 1833 the islands were settled by the British. Argentina nevertheless continued to argue that the 'Malvinas' were Argentine territory. (For more details on the origin of the dispute see History of the Falkland Islands.)

With the late 20th century absorption of the British Colonial Office into the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, successive British governments had come to see the dispute with Argentina as a minor problem from which they would have been happy to relieve themselves. Despite their government's neglect, the 1,800 or so inhabitants of British origin steadfastly refused to become part of Argentina, citing Article 73 (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapt11.htm) of the United Nations charter to support their position. In 1965, under UN Resolution 2065, Britain and Argentina started negotiations on the islands' future, but seventeen years later little had changed.

Argentina had become a military dictatorship in 1976, and faced severe economic problems and civil disunity, in particular from leftist guerrillas (the Montoneros). A bloody victory over the guerrillas was achieved in 1981 but the economy was in an appalling state with inflation running at 140% when General Galtieri came to power in December 1981.

The Royal Navy maintained a military presence in the area in the form of a small group of forty Royal Marines known as Naval Party 8901.

Build Up

Galtieri aimed to counterbalance public concern over economic and human rights issues with a speedy nationalist 'win' over the Falklands. Pressure was exerted in the UN with a subtle hint of invasion raised: the British missed this threat and continued to waste time (it is worth noting that British positions are not expressed centrally but rather emerge from the operations of special interests and departments without always being consistent; this has often misled outside observers). The Argentines interpreted the British position as disengagement, being willing to step away if the islands were invaded - a viewpoint encouraged by the planned withdrawal of the last Royal Navy presence in 1981 (together with a general down-sizing of the fleet) and the British Nationality Bill of 1981 which withdrew full citizenship rights from the Falkland Islanders. The British also helped by being unwilling to believe that the Argentineans would invade.

The invasion plan was developed by Admiral Jorge Anaya, the passionately anti-British head of the Argentine navy. Following the failure of further talks in January 1982, the plans were finalised and the invasion set for April. The attack was pre-empted by the 'invasion' of the island of South Georgia (1,390 km east of the Falklands) on March 19, 1982 by a group of patriotic Argentinean civilians posing as scrap metal merchants. The Royal Navy's Antarctic patrol vessel HMS Endurance was ordered to remove the civilians on March 25, but was blocked by three Argentine warships and wisely retreated. However on March 30 despite the further evidence of the Argentinean navy loading troops in Puerto Belgrano the UK Joint Intelligence Committee's Latin American group stated that "invasion was not imminent".

Failed diplomacy

From the time of the breaking of formal diplomatic relations, Peru represented Argentine diplomatic interests in the UK and Switzerland represented UK interests in Argentina. Argentine diplomats in London were credentialed as Peruvian diplomats of Argentine nationality and the UK diplomats in Buenos Aires were credentialed as Swiss diplomats of British nationality. Despite this civility, and although Peru and Switzerland exerted great diplomatic effort to avoid war, they were unable to head off the conflict; a peace plan proposed by Fernando Belaunde Terry was not accepted.

Invasion

Falkland Islands Governor Rex Hunt was informed by the British Government of a possible Argentine invasion on 31 March. The Governor summoned the two senior Royal Marines officers of Naval Party 8901 to Government House in Stanley to discuss the options for defending the Falklands.

He said during the meeting, "Sounds like the buggers mean it", still remaining composed despite the seriousness of the situation that the islands faced.

Major Mike Norman RM was given overall command of the Marines due to his seniority, while Major Gary Noott RM became the military advisor to Governor Hunt. The total strength was 68 Marines and 11 sailors, which was higher than would have been because the garrison was in the process of changing. Both the replacement and the troop preparing to leave were in the Falklands at the time of the invasion. This was decreased to 57 when twenty-two Royal Marines embarked aboard the Antarctic patrol ship Endurance to observe Argentinean soldiers based at South Georgia. Yet Graham Bound states in his book Falkland Islanders At War that approximately forty (both serving and past) members of the Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) reported for duty at their Drill Hall. Their commanding officer, Major Phil Sommers, tasked the militiamen to guard such key point as the telephone exchange, the radio station the the power station.

On April 2 the Argentine destroyer Santisima Trinidad halted 500 metres off Mullet Creek and lowered 21 Gemini assault craft into the water, containing 92 Special Forces of Lieutenant-Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots' 1st Amphibious Commando Grouping who then soon landed. The small party under Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Giachino who were to capture Government House had the shortest distance to go - two and a half miles due north - but Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party was six miles away over rough Falklands terrain. Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots in the book The Argentine Fight for The Falklands (Pen & Sword Military Classics) describes the main party's progress in the dark:

It was a nice night, with a moon, but the cloud covered the moon for most of the time. We were only a few minutes late but we had further to go. We didn't take a direct route; there would have been no landmarks that way. We went along the coast to Mullett Creek and set out from there, following a fence line, which was shown as running due north on the map. What the reconnaissance photographs had shown as 'grass' we found to be great hummocks. It was very hard going with our heavy loads; it was hot work. We eventually became split up into three groups. We only had one night sight; the lead man, Lieutenant Arias had it. One of the groups became separated when a vehicle came along the track we had to cross. We thought it was a military patrol. Another group just lost contact, and the third separation was caused by someone going too fast. This caused my second in command, Lieutenant Bardi, to fall. He suffered a hairline fracture of the ankle and had to be left behind with a man to help him. But, except for Lieutenant Bardi and his helper, we all got there by various means; I think we had a certain amount of luck. We were at Moody Brook by 5.30 a.m., just on the limits of the time planned, but with no time for the one hour's reconnaissance for which we had hoped.


The main party of Argentine Marines still assumed that the Moody Brook Barracks might contain sleeping Royal Marines. The Royal Marine barracks were ominously quiet, although a light was turned on in the office of the Royal Marine commander. No sentries were observed and it was a quiet night apart from the occasional animal call. Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots could hear nothing of any action at Government House nor from the distant landing beaches; nevertheless he ordered the assault to begin. Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots continues his account:

It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas, to force the British out of the buildings and capture them. Our orders were not to cause caualties if possible. That was the most difficult mission of my career. All our training as commandos was to fight aggressively and inflict maximum casualties on an enemy. We surrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north of Stanley Harbour, so that anyone who did get away would not able to reach the town and reinforce the British there. Then we threw the tear-gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty.

The noise of the stun and tear gas grenades had actually alerted Major Norman of the presence of Argentines on the island, and he thus drove back to Government House. Realising that the attack was coming from Moody Brook, he ordered all troop sections to converge on the house to enable the defence to be centralised.

Lying on a small hillock south of Government House, Lieutenant-Commander Giachino faced the difficluty of capturing this important objective with no radio and with a force of only sixteen men. He split his force into small groups, placing one on either side of the house and one at the rear. Unknown to them, Government House was the main concentration point of the Royal Marines. The first attack against Government House came in at 6.15 a.m. with Lieutenant-Commander Giachino entering the servants' annex of Government House, believing it to be the back door. Giachino, with four of his men, kicked down the door of the annex. Three Royal Marines - Corporals Sellen, Fleet and Marine Dorey - who were placed to cover the annex beat off the first attack. Giachino was hit instantly as he burst through the door, while Lieutenant Diego Quiroga was hit in the arm. The remaining three retreated to the maid's quarters. Giachino was not dead, but very badly wounded. An Argentine medic Corporal Ernesto Urbina attempted to get to Giachino but was wounded by a grenade. Giachino had been shot whilst carrying a live hand grenade. The Royal Marines had attempted to persuade the officer to get rid of the grenade so that they could give him medical treatment, but Giachino refused. After the surrender of the British forces at Government House, Giachino was taken to Stanley Hospital but died from heavy loss of blood.

There was a more serious action on the eastern edge of Port Stanley. Twenty US-built LVTP-7A1 tracked amphibious armoured personnel carriers from the 1st Amphibious Vehicles Battalion, carrying D and E Companies of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion had been landed from the ex-US tank landing ship Cabo San Antonio, and were being watched by a section of Royal Marines under the command of Lieutenant Bill Trollope. The armoured column trundled along the Airport Road into Stanley with three Amtracs (05, 07 and 19) in the vanguard and near the Ionospheric Research Station at exactly 7:15 am were engaged by a section of Royal Marines with anti-tank rockets and machine-guns. This from Lieutenant-Commander Hugo Santillan's official post-battle report:

We were on the last stretch of the road into Stanley. I saw a yellow road-repair machine which appeared to be broken down on a bend on the road, partially blocking the road. We were running fast by then, and I told my men to be careful. Perhaps the road was mined or the road repair machine was booby-trapped. I never finished the message. A machine-gun fired from one of the three white houses about 500 metres away and hit the right-hand Amtrac. The fire was very accurate. Then there were some explosions from a rocket launcher, but they were innacurate, falling a long way from us. We followed our standard operating procedure and took evasive action. The Amtrac on the right answered the fire and took cover in a little depression. Once he was out of danger, I told all three vehicles to disembark their men. I needed to evaluate the situation. I ordered my subordinate leaders to report what they could see. I told the battalion commander, and he told me stop and wait for him to come forward. He soon arrived. He told me to organize a fire base from my position, so that the other two companies could deploy to the north and swing round into the town. The same group of Royal Marines opened fire on my position again, fortunately ineffectively, and no one was hit. Commander Weinstabl and I decided it was time to force the British to withdraw. I ordered the crew with the recoiless rifle to fire one round of hollow charge at the ridge of the roof of the house where the machine-gun was, to cause a bang but not an explosion. We were still following our orders not to inflict caualties. The first round was about was about a hundred metres short, but the second hit the roof. The British troops then threw a purple smoke grenade; I thought it was their signal to withdraw. They had stopped firing, so Commander Weinstabl started the movement of the two companies around the position. Some riflemen in one of the houses started firing then; that was quite uncomfortable. I couldn't pinpoint their location, but one of my other Amtracs could and asked permission to open up with a mortar which he had. I authorized this, but only with three rounds and only at the roofs of the houses. Two rounds were short, but the third hit right in the centre of the roof; that was incredible. The British ceased firing then. (Martin Middlebrook, The Fight For The Malvinas: The Argentine Forces In The Falklands War, Viking, 1989, pp.36-37)

The fact that the Amtrac on the right manoeuvred itself off the road into a little depression and as it did so, disembarked the Marines inside out of view, encouraged the Royal Marines to think that Marine Mark Gibbs scored a direct hit on the passenger compartment of the APC.

Later, a proud British officer reported to his commanding officer, "We destroyed two APCs." though the 2nd Marines reported no casualties in the invasion, the Royal Marines spread their version of reality. Lieutenant Bill Trollope, with No. 2 Section, describes the action:

Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down the Airport Road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three [missiles], two 84mm and one 66mm, missed. Subsequently one 66mm fired by Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger comprtment and one 84mm [Marines Brown and Betts] hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was recieved from that vehicle. The remaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and onpened fire. We engaged them with GPMG, SLR and sniper rifle [Sergeant Shepherd] for about a minute before we threw white phosphours [a smoke grenade] and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens. Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy, but mostly innacurate. (Graham Bound, Falklands Islanders At War, Pen & Sword Books, 2002, pp. 52-53)

Lieutenant Trollope and his men withdrew along Davis Street running behind the houses with Argentinian Marines in hot pursuit and went to ground firing up the road when it became obvious they could not reach Government House.

At Government House, Major Norman received a radio report from Corporal York's section, which was positioned at Stanley Harbour, observing any possible Argentinian ship movement. The Corporal proceeded to report of three potential targets in sight and of which he should engage first. "What are the targets?" the Major enquired. The response must have been rather shocking to hear. "Target number one is an aircraft carrier, target number two is a cruiser...", the line as soon as he had reached cruiser went dead.

Corporal York decided to withdraw his section and proceeded to booby trap their Carl Gustav launcher, before paddling their Gemini assault boat and heading north across Port William. As he did so, York claimed an Argentine destroyer began pursuing them. His initiative led to the Gemini reaching an anchored Polish fishing vessel, hiding the small assault boat in its shadow. They patiently waited for a chance, before paddling to the shore and then landing on a small beach.

Back at Government House, another incident occurred, when the three Argentinean survivors of the skirmish at the House inadvertently alerted Major Noot to their presence, while they had been preparing to leave their hiding place. The Major fired shots into the maid's room ceiling. The startled Argentines tumbled down the stairs and surrendered to the Major, becoming the first POWs of the Falklands War. Lieutenant-Commander Giachino's 'snatch party' was thus completely neutralized and it would be at least two hours before the bulk of the 1st Amphibious Commando Grouping could reach Government House.

There is some evidence that the use of stun grenades and flash suppresors during the battle for Government House led the Royal Marines inside to believe they were facing a company of Marines and were hopelessly outnumbered. Certainly Governor Hunt called Patrick Watts by telephone and said he believed the attacking force to be about 200. 'They must have 200 around us now. They've been throwing rifle grenades at us; I think they may be mortars, I don't know. They came along very quickly and very close, and then they retreated. Maybe they are waiting until the APCs come along and they think they'll lose less casualties that way." (Source: Graham Bound, Falkland Islanders At War, 2002)

Alerted by the Amtrac drivers revving their engines, the shocked Royal Marines in Government House suddenly saw the three Amtracs that had earlier on been engaged by Lieutenant Trollope and his section, pushing on toward Moody Brook and link up with Sanchez-Sabarots and his weary Commandos plodding along the road to reinforce the colleagues at Government House. Major Norman had earlier advised Rex Hunt that the Royal Marines and the Governor could break out and set up a 'seat of government' elsewhere but he decided to surrender to the now overwhelming Argentine forces but Corporal York's section remained un-captured. On the 4th of April, his section reached a secluded shepherd's hut owned by a woman called Mrs. Watson. He had no radio, and due to worries about possible civilian deaths, chose to surrender to Argentine forces. They radioed their position to the Argentines using a local islander's radio and York subsequently ordered his men to destroy and then bury their weapons.

After the surrender, the Royal Marines and the members of FIDF were then herded to the playing fields. Pictures were taken of the British prisoners, which galvanised the British public when seen. Soon afterwards, the Royal Marines were then moved to a C-130 transport aircraft, which would take them to Uruguay and on to Britain.

Rex Hunt was allowed to make a farewell address on local radio, and even wore his Governor's ceremonial uniform, attracting ridicule from Argentines, before changing back into civilian clothes. One Marine as he headed up the ramp, gave an Argentine guard a parting shot that would come true in 72 days time. "Don't make yourself too comfy mate, we'll be back."

In Buenos Aires huge flag-waving crowds flooded the Plaza de Mayo on hearing the news. Argentina's losses in the operation were one dead and three wounded. In London the government was in more of a state of shock on what became known as "Black Friday". The next day Argentine forces seized the island chain of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, 1500 km to the east of the Falklands.

Life under the Occupation

In spite of earlier assurances that the Islanders' way of life and cultural identity would be maintained, Argentina made changes that were unwelcome, such as the changing of Port Stanley's name to 'Puerto Argentino', the adoption of Spanish as an official language, and commanding traffic to drive on the right. In spite of arrows being painted on the roads by the occupying forces, Islanders defiantly continued to drive on the left.

Image:galtier.jpg
Argentine President Galtieri

Task Force

The British were quick to organise diplomatic pressure against Argentina and to assemble a task force to dispatch to the islands, centred around the aircraft carriers HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes. Although the public mood in the UK was in support of an attempt to reclaim the islands, international opinion was much more divided. To some, Britain was a former colonial power, seeking to reclaim a colony from a local power, and this was a message that the Argentines initially used to garner support; however to others Britain was seen as the stable democracy that had had its territory invaded by a military dictatorship. The British won the diplomacy game by arguing that the Falkland Islanders were entitled to use the UN principle of self-determination and by appearing to be ready to compromise. The UN Secretary-General said that he was amazed at the compromise that the UK had offered but Argentina rejected it, and based their arguments on rights to territory based on actions before 1945 and the creation of the UN. Many UN members realised that if territorial claims this old could be resurrected, and then invasions of territory allowed unchallenged, that their own borders were not safe and so on April 3 the UN passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands and the cessation of hostilities. On April 10 the EEC approved trade sanctions against Argentina. In spite of this Ronald Reagan and the U.S. administration remained neutral.

Shuttle Diplomacy and US Involvement

Legally, the United States had military treaty obligations to both parties in the war, bound to the U.K. by NATO and to Argentina by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Alexander Haig, the United States Secretary of State, briefly (April 8-April 30) headed a "shuttle diplomacy" mission before President Ronald Reagan declared US support for Britain and instituted sanctions against Argentina. Support of the USA was initially equivocal, and is reported to be the result of urging by Caspar Weinberger, who advised the President to support the UK. Reagan famously declared at the time that he could not understand why two allies were arguing over "That little ice-cold bunch of land down there". Reagan sympathised with Galtieri because Galtieri clamped down on leftists in South America. He had received a reportedly warm reception when he visited the US. Galtieri likely didn't think that the UK would react; otherwise it is doubtful Argentina would have launched the attack. Of course, this would have been astounding to British people at the time, already familiar with Margaret Thatcher's controversial uncompromising style of government. In as many words, she declared that the Crown and the Empire had been assaulted, and would not surrender the Falkland Islands to the Argentinian jackboot. This stance was aided, at least domestically, by the staunchly conservative British press, especially The Sun, which ran such headlines as 'THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK' (when the British taskforce was dispatched) and 'GOTCHA' (following the sinking of the General Belgrano). A US preoccupation with the Soviet Union and communism and the thought Britain could handle the matter on her own may have factored into this view as well, though the validity of this idea varies. Certainly less respect would have resulted had there been a lot of assistance and would not been out of line of the US passive condoning of Galtieri's earlier actions. In the broader sense of the Cold War, with the performance of UK forces watched closely by the Soviet Union, it was worthwhile for the UK to handle without assistance a conflict minor in scale compared to an all-out NATO vs. Warsaw Pact war. Regardless, American non-interference was vital: Ascension Island, a UK possession, was on lease to the Americans and the British needed to resume its use as a relay point and air base. The main American contribution was AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles of the latest L model. These missiles were much more deadly then older models of the Sidewinder. There were also rumours, later expanded upon by Weinberger, which spoke of lending an aircraft carrier, although this was not public knowledge at the time. Use of US spy satellites and intelligence sharing is reported by some sources. It is worth noting that both Weinberger and Reagan would go on to receive honorary knighthoods, the honour of Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, from Queen Elizabeth II.

In September 2001, Mexican president Vicente Fox would cite the conflict as proof of the failure of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Preparing for War

Because of the long distance between the Falklands and United Kingdom, the British were reliant on a naval task force. This task force would have to be self-reliant and able to project its force across the littoral area of the Islands. The taskforce centred on the two small aircraft carriers, commanded by Rear Admiral John Woodward (commonly known as Sandy Woodward). A second component was the amphibious assault shipping, commanded by Commodore M. C. Clapp RN. Contrary to common belief, Admiral Woodward did not command Commodore Clapp's ships. The embarked force comprised 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, (with attached units from the Parachute Regiment) under the command of Brigadier J. Thompson RM. Most of this force was aboard the hastily commandeered cruise liner Canberra. Both Clapp and Woodward reported directly to the Commander in Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, in Britain, who was the overall commander of the operation. In order to keep neutral shipping out of the way during the war, the UK declared a 'war exclusion zone' of 200 nautical miles (370 km) around the Falklands before commencing operations.

HRH The Duke of York served as a helicopter pilot off the Invincible during the war.

The British called their counter-invasion Operation Corporate. When this task force sailed from Britain, with The Queen seeing the armada off, the American news magazine Newsweek cover headline was "The Empire Strikes Back!"

War

By mid-April the Royal Air Force had set-up an airbase at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic island of Ascension, including a sizable force of Vulcan bombers, Victor refuelling aircraft, and F-4 Phantom fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. However a small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.

Recapture of South Georgia

The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquat, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of marines from 42 Commando, a troop of Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines embarked on the RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror on the 19th, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley-Page Victor on the 20th. The first landings of SAS troops took place on the 21st, but weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after several helicopters crashed in fog.

On the 23rd a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being turned about to deep sea to avoid interception. On the 24th the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine, the ARA Santa Fe, locating it on the 25th and damaging it enough that the crew decided to abandon it. With the Tidespring now far out to sea and an additional defending force of the submarine's crew now landed, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 75 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march the Argentine forces surrendered, making it official the next day. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, broke the news to the media telling them to "Rejoice! Rejoice!".

Black Buck Raids

On May 1st, operations against the Falklands opened with the Black Buck 1 attack by RAF Avro Vulcan V bombers on the airfield at Port Stanley. The Vulcan was designed for medium-range missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the South Atlantic, requiring several in-flight refuelling missions. However the RAF's refuelling planes were mostly converted Victors with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in air. A force of 11 refuelling planes was required for only two Vulcans, a massive logistical effort. In the end only a single bomb hit the runway at Port Stanley, but the Argentine Air Force (FAA) realized that the British were likewise capable of hitting targets on the mainland, and immediately recalled all jet fighters to the mainland to protect against this possibility. Thus the attack was a failure in a tactical sense, but a huge success strategically, denying any close support and requiring Argentinean aircraft to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

Only minutes after Black Buck, nine Sea Harriers from the Hermes followed up the raid by dropping cluster bombs on Port Stanley and the smaller grass airfield at Goose Green. Both missions scored aircraft kills on the ground, as well as causing some damage to the airfield infrastructure. Meanwhile the FAA had already launched an attack of their own with Grupo 6, on information that landings had already taken place. Four of these planes were lost to Sea Harriers operating from the Invincible, while combat broke out between other Harriers and Mirage fighters of Grupo 8, both sides refusing to fight at the other's best altitude, until the Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down, and another was damaged and made for Port Stanley, where the now twitchy Argentine defenders immediately shot it down.

Sinking of the Belgrano

HMS Conqueror
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HMS Conqueror

On May 2 the World War II-vintage Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano was sunk by the Conqueror (using WWII vintage torpedoes) outside the exclusion zone, with the loss of 321 lives (the British newspaper The Sun initially greeted this with the headline GOTCHA!). This loss hardened the stance of the Argentine government. The loss of the Belgrano also became a cause celebre to anti-war campaigners (such as Tam Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. However, under international law, the direction that a naval vessel of a belligerent in a war is headed has no bearing on its status. The naval vessels of a belligerent power are liable to be sunk anywhere in international waters and within the territorial waters of the belligerents in the conflict.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a very important strategic effect. After the loss of the Belgrano, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. Therefore, the two destroyers supporting the Belgrano and the task force built around the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented.

Sinking of the HMS Sheffield

Two days after the Belgrano sinking, on May 4, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike. The Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in order to provide some sort of radar and missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were detected by an Argentinean Navy Air Force (CANA) P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two CANA Dassault Super Etendards were launched, each armed with a single Exocet. Refuelled by a C-130 Hercules shortly after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped up for a radar check and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away. One missed HMS Yarmouth, due to her deployment of chaff, but the other hit the Sheffield and set her on fire, killing 22 sailors onboard.

Whilst fighting the fire, Yarmouth came under attack from a GUPPY class, Argentinean submarine, who subsequently fired 9 torpedoes at her. None of the 9 made contact due to reactions of her Helicopter crew and Mortar crew. HMS Sheffield was abandoned several hours later and sank on the 10th May, whilst under tow from the Yarmouth. Meanwhile the other Type 42s were withdrawn from their precarious position, leaving the British task force open to attack.

The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May. UN attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms.

Landing at Port San Carlos

San Carlos landing sites
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San Carlos landing sites
Context of landings in the Falklands
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Context of landings in the Falklands

During the night of May 21 the British made an amphibious landing on beaches near San Carlos Water, on the northern coast of East Falkland, putting the 4000 men of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by 2 Para and 3 Para, ashore from the amphibious ships and the liner Canberra: 2 Para and 40 Commando landing at San Carlos beach; 45 Commando at Ajax bay; 3 Para at Port San Carlos. By dawn the next day they had established a secure bridgehead from which to conduct offensive operations.

From there Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Port Stanley.

At sea the paucity of British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on the 21st, HMS Antelope on the 23rd, and the MV Atlantic Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway building equipment and tents on the 25th. Also lost on this day was Coventry, a sister to HMS Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword. Argonaut and Brilliant were badly damaged. The Argentines lost over thirty aircraft in these assaults. Reports after the war indicated that many British lives had been saved by SAS/SBS teams destroying aircraft on the ground.

Goose Green

Starting early May 27 and through May 28 2 Para approached and attacked Darwin and Goose Green which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle which lasted all night and into the next day; seventeen British and 200 Argentine soldiers were killed and 1400 Argentinean troops were taken prisoner. Due to a gaffe by the BBC the invasion of Goose Green was announced on the BBC World Service before it actually happened. It was during this attack that Lt Col H Jones, the CO of 2 Para was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. See also Battle of Goose Green.

Falkland east island showing San Carlos bridgehead, Teal Inlet, Mt. Kent and Mt. Challenger
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Falkland east island showing San Carlos bridgehead, Teal Inlet, Mt. Kent and Mt. Challenger

With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos bridgehead. From May 27th men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking east across the Falklands towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet. Meanwhile 42 Cdo and the SAS moved by helicopter to within sight of Stanley when they seized Mt Kent and Mt Challenger. The SAS had several clashes with Argentine Commandos in the Mount Kent area, and although four SAS were wounded, the Argentines who were members of the 602nd Commando Company, had the worst of the clashes. They had two men killed and one captured in an SAS ambush at Bluff Cove Peak in an action on 30 May. First Lieutenant Ruben Eduardo Marquez and Sergeant Oscar Humberto Blas were posthumously decorated for their part in this action. A larger fight took place on 31 May. Argentine Commandos were observed moving to Top Malo House. Nineteen Royal Marines were helicoptered there in daylight and attacked the house. One group with 66mm rockets, grenades and rifles were to provide covering fire as the assault teams moved close to the house. As these followed a sheep fence to keep them on line for the house hidden beyond a hillock, the covering team doubled out to the right to come out of cover a few hundred metres from the house. First Lieutenant Ernesto Emilio Espinosa at one upper window saw them and gave the alarm, but the Royal Marines pressed home the attack with anti-tank rockets which set it ablaze within seconds. Reserves of ammunition on the ground floor 'cooked off' and the building peeled open in a ball of flame. Even so, the assault teams were met by steady fire that wounded three of them as they advanced towards the front door, from which Sergeant Mateo Domingo Sbert was firing while others leapt from windows to withdraw down a small valley. One Royal Marine sergeant, against orders, made a dash into the open, drawing Argentine fire long enought for his 'oppos' to find the direction of the enemy, before he fell hit in the left shoulder. His move gave the Marines the momentary sighting that was all they needed to follow their quarry; and all thirteen Argetine Commandos were killed or captured after what had been forty minutes of sharp action.

By June 1, with the arrival of a further 5000 British troops of 5 Inf Brigade landed at San Carlos from the liner QE2, new British divisional commander, Major General JJ Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Port Stanley.

During this build-up the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 48, including 32 Welsh Guards on the RFA Sir Galahad and the RFA Sir Tristram on June 8. Many others suffered serious burns. These troops were still on the ships because the loss of the helicopters on the Atlantic Conveyor meant that they had had to be transferred to the islands by boat. Unfortunately, and tragically, the commanders on board had ignored the advice of the troops on the ground to get ashore as soon as possible.

Battle for Port Stanley

On the night of June 11, after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high ground surrounding Port Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously assaulted Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, and Mount Longdon. During this battle thirteen were killed when HMS Glamorgan, which was providing naval gunfire support, was struck by an Exocet fired from the back of a truck, further displaying the vulnerability of ships to anti-ship missiles. On this day Sgt Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company 3 PARA died in a grenade attack on an Argentine Bunker which was to later earn him a posthumous Victoria Cross.

After a night of fierce fighting all objectives were secured.

On the night of June 13 the second phase of attacks started in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para captured Wireless Ridge and the 2nd Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown. As the fighting was coming to a close the Falklands Islanders on the eastern edge of Port Stanley were in imminent danger of being shot by a company of the 3rd Infantry Regiment as the conscripts and regulars steeled themselves for the final house-to-house battle near Government House. This is revealed in the book The Battle For The Falklands War by authors Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins and Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre, Commander of the 10th Argentine Mechanized Infantry Brigade, has admitted that the abrupt end of the ground fighting was hastened by fear of war crimes against the civilians.

On June 14 the commander of the Argentine garrison in Port Stanley, Mario Menendez, surrendered to Major General JJ Moore Royal Marines. 9800 Argentine troops were made POWs and were repatriated to Argentina on the liner Canberra. On June 20 the British retook the South Sandwich Islands and declared the hostilities were at an end.

The war lasted 72 days, with 236 British and around 700 Argentinean soldiers, sailors, and airmen, killed.

Analysis

Military

Militarily the Falklands War was important for a number of reasons;

It was one of the few major naval battles so far to have occurred after the end of World War II. As such this conflict illustrated the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and reaffirmed the effectiveness of aircraft in naval warfare.

It vindicated the UK decision to develop the VTOL Harrier aircraft, that showed its capability of operating from forward bases with no runways. At sea it demonstrated the domination of airpower in major engagements and the usefulness of carriers.

The logistic capability of the UK armed forces was stretched to the absolute limit in order to mount an amphibious operation so far from a home-base, onto mountainous islands which have few roads. After the war much work was done to improve both the logistic and amphibious capability of the Royal Navy.

The role of special forces units, which destroyed many Argentinean aircraft, and carried out intelligence gathering operations, were reaffirmed.

The usefulness of helicopters in combat, logistic, and casevac operations was reaffirmed.

At sea, some shortcomings of warship design were made apparent, particularly the danger of using aluminium in ships (although it did not catch fire it melted in the heat). Nylon was shown to be a poor choice of fabric in uniforms, as it is more flammable than cotton and also melts with heat, sticking the incendiary fabric to the skin and causing avoidable casualties.

Political

The Falklands War illustrates the role of political miscalculation and miscommunication in creating war. Both sides seriously underestimated the importance of the Falklands to the other. The Falklands War illustrates the role of chance in determining what happens in a war. Some commentators believe that the war could have ended in an Argentine victory had one of the Exocets hit an aircraft carrier, or if Argentina had attacked the artillery batteries of the British artillery, using the three paratroop regiments already deployed at Comodoro Rivadavia. Equally, if the Argentineans had made better preparations to hold the islands, they might have been able to do so, but they did not expect that the British would attempt to carry out a war 6000 miles (10,000 km) from home. Either way an Argentine victory would have been an unacceptable show of weakness on the part of the UK during a intense period of the Cold War, and as result it's highly doubtful such an outcome would have been allowed to remain for long. With the UK being a integral US ally and important part of NATO, to permit a loss would have been signal to the USSR that the NATO alliance was militarily and politically weak.

The war was a massive boost to the popularity of Margaret Thatcher and played a role in ensuring her re-election in 1983, although several members of her government resigned, including the former Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. It has also been said by diplomats that following the British victory there was an increase in international respect for Britain, formerly regarded as a fading colonial power. As mentioned earlier, the victory was not overlooked by the USSR and was important junction in the Cold War. Argentina's loss forced President Galtieri to resign, paving the way for the restoration of democracy.

Medical

During the operations, several wounded British soldiers had to spend hours in the cold before receiving medical aid. Many recovered beyond what medicine of the time thought possible. This discovery has led doctors to propose that the way to treat massive loss of blood would not be transfusions that dissolve the curdle, but allow the body to lower its temperature and the blood to curdle before the transfusion.

See also


Related content
Military Forces Falklands War Ground Forces - Falklands War Air Forces - Falklands War Naval Forces
External Links Article on the Conflict 1 (http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/1998-9/Haney.htm#1) - Chronology of Events (http://www.yendor.com/vanished/falklands-war.html) - Article on the Conflict 2 (http://guest.xinet.com/ignacio/polsi342/falklands.html) - Reagan Q&A Transcript (http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1982/43082b.htm) - About high-speed torpedoes (http://www.onr.navy.mil/sci_tech/engineering/333_mechanics/usea_counter.asp) - many articles (http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/index.html)
General Related History -- Military history -- British military history -- War
Falklands War Related History of the Falkland Islands - South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands




da:Falklandskrigen de:Falkland-Krieg es:Guerra de las Malvinas fr:Guerre des Malouines he:מלחמת פוקלנד ja:フォークランド戦争 pt:Guerra das Malvinas fi:Falklandin sota sv:Falklandskriget

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